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Summary of Findings 
 
 
• A leading Renewable Fuel Standard reform proposal considered by 
policymakers would allow E15 (fuel containing 15% ethanol) sales 
throughout the year and implement a cap on D6 RIN prices between 
$0.10 to $0.20/RIN.  
 
• While year-round sales of E15 would encourage retailers to sell the 
fuel, capping D6 RIN prices would reduce consumption of E15 and E85.   
 
• A cap on D6 RIN prices between $0.10/gal to $0.20/gal would likely 
reduce the effective ethanol mandate from 15 billion gallons to about 
14.3 billion gallons in 2018. 
 
• Unless increased ethanol exports compensate for the reduced mandate, 
corn prices would decrease under the proposal’s D6 RIN price cap. 
 
   
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Congress enacted the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) through the 
Energy Independence and Security Act in 2007. The U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) administers the program. The RFS laid a path to significantly expand 
production and use of both conventional (corn ethanol) and advanced (low 
greenhouse gas) biofuel production and consumption in the United States. The 
policy objectives include (i) lowering greenhouse gas emissions of transportation 
fuels; (ii) supporting rural economies; and (iii) enhancing energy security by 
expanding domestic transportation fuel production.  
 
Until 2013, the fuel industry was able to comply with the RFS mandates by blending 
10% ethanol into most gasoline sold in the United States. E10 (fuel containing 90% 
gasoline and 10% ethanol) now constitutes more than 95% of fuel used in gasoline-
powered vehicles, and expanding ethanol consumption by increasing E10 market 
penetration is no longer a viable compliance option.i The E10 blending limit is 
commonly referred to as the E10 blend wall. The fuel industry has complied with 
RFS mandates beyond the E10 blend wall by increasing sales of E85 (which contains 
between 51 and 83 percent ethanol), other advanced biofuels, and biodiesel. If EPA is 
to continue expanding biofuel mandates, which is the current congressional intent, 
the remaining compliance options are limited because of both economic and 
technical barriers.   
 
The saturation of E10 in the marketplace, limited demand for higher blend ethanol 
fuels, and high production costs for biodiesel mean that compliance with the 
program is costly. This is best evidenced by the high and volatile prices for RFS 
tradeable compliance credits, known as RINs, since 2013. High RIN prices increase 
compliance costs for refiners, the obligated party under the policy, who must 
purchase or generate RINs to demonstrate compliance to the EPA. The economics 
literature finds that refiners are likely fully compensated for high RIN costs through 
higher wholesale gasoline prices. Despite this, RIN costs have dominated recent 
headlines due to the bankruptcy proceedings of Philadelphia Energy Solutions 
(PES).ii PES partly blames the cost of RINs as a cause of its financial troubles in its 
bankruptcy proceedings.  
 
The PES bankruptcy has led to a standoff between U.S. senators representing 
Midwestern states and senators from states with significant petroleum refining 
capacity. Recent White House meetings between these parties have led to one 
compromise proposal that is receiving a significant amount of attention. Under this 
proposal, RIN prices (i.e., D6 RINs, on which we focus in this document) would be 
capped at between 10 and 20 cents in exchange for allowing year-round sales of E15. 
E15 is a gasoline blend containing 15% ethanol. The lack of an E15 waiver from the 
Clean Air Act rules restricts E15 sales to non-summer months. This restriction is one 
reason why major gasoline retailers are reluctant to invest in fuel pumps and tanks 
that are needed before they can offer E15 in their stations.  
 
In this policy brief, we discuss the economics of this proposal.iii,iv We first provide 
relevant background on technical issues currently limiting E15 sales, the economics 
of RIN price caps, and the role of RINs in expanding ethanol use in the United 
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States. We then discuss the demand for higher-blend ethanol fuels (E15 and E85), 
and implications for RIN price caps for E15 and E85 sales.  
 
 
Background 
An understanding of several technical and economic factors is needed to understand 
the current discussions about the RFS and E15. Here we briefly discuss how the EPA 
could implement a RIN price cap. We then summarize how fuel content restrictions 
currently limit year-round sales of mid-ethanol blend fuels. Last, we summarize the 
role of RINs in incentivizing consumption of high ethanol-blend fuels.   
 
Implementing a RIN price caps 
The EPA could implement a cap on RIN prices in two ways. First, EPA could offer 
“waiver credits” much like they currently do for the cellulosic portion of the RFS 
mandates.v The EPA would allow parties to purchase RINs at a fixed price from the 
Agency instead of on the market. Biofuel production would not generate these waiver 
credits. Second, the EPA could allow parties to accrue compliance deficits and pay a 
fixed non-compliance fee. 
 
These two mechanisms would cap RIN prices and reduce the economic incentive for 
increasing biofuel use. Refiners will comply with RFS mandates by purchasing RINs 
generated on the open market only when RIN prices are less than the waiver credit 
price. Suppose that fuel retailers require a RIN price that is higher than the capped 
price to sell E15 or E85. Rather than compensate the retailer by purchasing a higher-
priced RIN, refiners will go to the EPA to purchase RINs at the capped price.  
 
RIN price caps have merit in certain circumstances. High RIN prices since 2013 have 
led to extensive RFS lobbying by both the biofuels and oil industries. The EPA has 
responded to this pressure by adjusting the statutory mandates. This process has led 
to high RIN price volatility. If the EPA or Congress want to meet RFS mandates only 
if compliance costs are below a certain level, a RIN price cap is the most efficient way 
to do so.vi Under a RIN price cap, investors, producers, and other market 
participants know that they must produce and sell biofuels at or below the cap, 
reducing uncertainty caused by policy gyrations.  
 
The level of a RIN price cap is crucial. A low cap signals to markets that only low-cost 
compliance options can be used to meet the mandates and that remaining 
compliance will be met through wavier credits purchases or non-compliance fees. A 
low RIN price cap also reduces the incentive to blend biofuels into motor fuel and 
increase biofuel fueling infrastructure (e.g., blender pumps). 
 
RVP Waivers and Biofuel Use 
Restrictions on Reid vapor pressure (RVP) for retail gasoline-ethanol blends limit 
sales of E15 and certain higher blend in summer months. RVP is a measure of 
gasoline’s volatility. The U.S. Clean Air Act limits RVP during high ozone seasons to 
reduce evaporative emissions from gasoline.vii   
 
Blending ethanol into gasoline impacts a fuel’s RVP nonlinearly. At blending levels 
below about 50%, RVP levels generally exceed Clean Air Act standards.  Blends with 
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Figure 1: RVP and Ethanol Blending  
Source: National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
greater than 50% ethanol 
meet the RVP restrictions. 
Figure 1 graphs the 
relationship between ethanol 
blending and RVP along with 
the nine pounds per square 
inch (psi) summertime 
limit.viii As can be seen, any 
ethanol blend below 50% 
violates current summertime 
standards.   
 
The Clean Air Act includes a 
waiver for E10, allowing the 
fuel to be one psi greater than the 
limit for other fuels. While the Act 
includes some exceptions, the waiver has generally allowed E10 to be sold year-
round in all states. Higher blend ethanol fuels, however, do not have a waiver. For 
very high ethanol blend fuels like E85, this is not an issue since RVP levels are below 
the nine psi limit. However, the lack of a one psi waiver for E15 and other mid-level 
ethanol blends necessarily limits retailers’ ability to sell the fuels in the summer.  
 
The economic role of RINs in the consumption of ethanol  
The EPA created the RIN system to implement and enforce the RFS blending 
mandates. RINs are a tradable commodity used to track U.S. ethanol and biodiesel 
use. Every gallon of biofuel produced in or imported into the United States generates 
a RIN. The RIN is detached from a gallon of biofuel when it is blended into the U.S. 
fuel supply at wholesale terminals.ix Refiners comply with the RFS either by blending 
biofuels and selling them to domestic wholesale markets, thereby generating RINs 
in-house or by purchasing separated RINs from other parties.   
 
RIN prices impact retail fuel prices in two ways. Because refiners must purchase 
RINs for every gallon of gasoline and diesel they sell, RINs act as an implicit tax on 
gasoline and diesel. On the other side of the market, every gallon of biofuel generates 
a RIN that can be sold to refiners, constituting an implicit subsidy for ethanol and 
biodiesel. Retail fuel prices reflect both the tax on gasoline and diesel and the subsidy 
for biofuel. Therefore, increasing the blend-rate of ethanol in gasoline increases the 
subsidized portion of the fuel and decreases the taxed portion of the fuel.   
 
RIN prices reflect the cost of compliance with the RFS. They are determined by the 
cost of covering biofuel production costs when they exceed gasoline and diesel prices 
and the need to lower the value of biofuels in fuel blends to increase consumption to 
meet mandates.x  High RIN prices create an incentive for the fuel industry to reduce 
compliance costs by finding the lowest-cost alternatives to meeting mandates. Costs 
can be lowered either by decreasing biofuel production costs or by increasing the 
value of biofuels in the marketplace by expanding sales of higher ethanol blend fuels, 
mainly E15 and E85.   
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Figure 2: Retail Fuel Prices and RINs ($/gal)  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Expanding E15 and E85 sales 
requires fuel stations to invest 
in E15 and E85 fueling 
infrastructure and consumers 
to buy the fuel. RIN prices 
play a crucial role in 
incentivizing E15 and E85 
demand. All else equal, an 
increase in RIN prices 
increase the ethanol subsidy 
and gasoline tax in retail fuel 
blends. The subsidy for the 
ethanol will outweigh the gas 
tax for fuels with higher 
ethanol blends. Therefore, as 
RIN prices rise, the retail price 
spread between low- and high-
ethanol blend fuels increases.   
 
Figure 2 illustrates how RIN prices impact E0, E10, E15, and E85 retail prices. To 
create the Figure, we hold wholesale ethanol and gasoline prices constant at 
$1.45/gal and $1.80/gal, respectively, and assume retail fuel is marked up over 
wholesale fuel costs by $0.75/gal.xi We then calculate retail fuel prices as a function 
of RIN prices, which we vary between zero and $1.00/gal.xii  
 
When RIN prices are zero, the only factor driving retail prices is the different 
wholesale costs of ethanol and gasoline. As RIN prices increase, the price of E0 
increases, E10 prices remain roughly constant, and E15 and E85 prices decrease. The 
focus of this report is the impact of RIN prices on E15 and E85 demand. Consumers 
will have a greater incentive to switch from E10 to E15 or E85 as the price difference 
between the fuels increases. At a zero RIN price, the (E15-E10) and (E85-E10) price 
gap is -$0.018 and -$0.23 per gallon, respectively. At a $0.10 RIN price, the price 
gaps increase to -$0.023 and -$0.30 per gallon. At a $0.50/gal RIN price, roughly 
the D6 RIN price in early March 2018, the two gaps increase to -$0.045 and -$0.59 
per gallon, clearly increasing the incentive for consumers to switch from E10 to E15, 
but even more increasing the incentives to switch from E10 to E85.  
 
Demand for high ethanol blend fuels 
We now turn to E85 and E15 demand factors. We build on research by Babcock and 
Pouliot (2014) and Liao, Pouliot, and Babcock (2016).xiii 
 
E85 consumption 
We highlight here several factors that influence E85 demand in the United States.  
 
Flex Fuel Vehicle (FFV): To fuel using E85, a consumer must own a flex fuel vehicle. 
Many car companies offer vehicle models with FFV options, and for many years FFVs 
were a standard feature for many cars. Owning an FFV allows a motorist to fuel with 
any fuel from E0 to E85, affording them maximum flexibility in choosing between 
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low- and high-ethanol blend fuels. 
Around 20 million out of over 260 
million vehicles in the United States 
today are FFVs. However, most 
located in major metropolitan areas 
without easy access to E85. Also, the 
number of new vehicle models 
offered as FFVs has declined in the 
last three years as incentives for their 
production under the Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy standards 
were phased out.   
 
Fuel Station Availability: E85 
requires fuel station owners to invest 
in specialized fueling infrastructure. 
This may include installing in new 
underground tanks or modifying existing tanks, and purchasing above ground 
dispensing equipment. Many stations looking to offer E15 or E85 install “blender 
pumps dispensers” that draw fuel from tanks containing E85 or E100 (pure ethanol) 
and E10. This allows the station owner to offer multiple mid- to high-ethanol blend 
fuels. According to the Alternative Fuels Data Center, 3,224 stations currently offer 
E85 in the United States as of early March 2018.  
 
Energy Content Price Discounts: A gallon of pure ethanol contains around 33% less 
energy than a gallon of pure gasoline.xiv As the ethanol content of a fuel increases, 
vehicle mileage per gallon decreases, and consumers will need to fill up their tanks 
more often. Therefore, if an ethanol blend (e.g., E10) and gasoline (E0) are sold at 
the same price, the ethanol blend will be more expensive on a cost per mile driven 
basis because it contains less energy. Using the example from Figure 2, if we inflate 
ethanol costs by 50% to account for its lower energy content, the (E15-E10) and 
(E85-E10) price gap decreases to -$0.01/GGE and -$0.11/GGE when RIN prices are 
$0.50, where GGE stands for “gasoline-gallon-equivalent.” This shows how current 
RIN prices incentivize retail demand for E5 and E85 by offsetting the lower energy 
content of ethanol.  
 
Octane Content: While ethanol contains less energy than gasoline, the fuel has a 
much higher octane rating. Octane is a measure of a fuel’s combustion resistance, 
and higher performance vehicles typically require higher-octane fuels to operate 
efficiently. Regular gasoline usually has an 87 octane rating, while premium gasoline 
typically has an octane rating of at least 91. A gallon of ethanol has an octane rating 
of 113. This higher octane has allowed refiners to decrease the production of octane 
at the refinery, reducing refining costs. Instead of producing 87 octane gasoline, 
most refiners today produce 84 octane gasoline and blend 10% ethanol to reach the 
required 87 octane rating. E85 has an even higher octane rating, typically over 100, 
while the octane value of E15 is 88. This one-point advantage in octane rating over 
E10 offsets some of the fuel efficiency disadvantages of E15 relative to E10. The value 
of octane is likely to increase in future years as demand for high-octane fuel 
Figure 3: E85 Demand and E85/E10 Price Ratios 
Source: Liao, Pouliot, and Babcock, 2016 
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continues to grow. Most light-duty vehicle 
manufacturers are increasingly producing 
engines that require 91 and higher octane levels 
to operate.xv   
 
Recent work by Liao, Pouliot, and Babcock 
(2016) estimate the demand for E85 using 
observational and survey data gathered in 2015. 
The authors estimate willingness to pay for E85 
fuel. The authors find that the average U.S. flex 
fuel vehicle owner requires that E85 be 
discounted well below energy cost parity 
relative to E10 to switch fuels. Figure 3 graphs 
the estimated demand for E85 relative to its 
price ratio to E10 (Price of E85/Price of E10). 
Few motorists choose E85 when it is priced 
greater than or equal to E10. Demand for E85 
increases as it becomes less expensive than 
E10. However, even when E85 is priced 40% 
below E10, so that the fuel is cheaper on an 
energy-equivalent basis, only around 50% of 
FFV owners purchase the fuel. The findings 
suggest that selling large volumes of E85 will 
require high RIN prices. For reference, in 
Figure 2, the (E85-E10) price discount exceeds 
-40% only when RIN prices are over 
$1.00/RIN. 
 
E15 consumption 
Many of the same factors that influence E85 demand also will likely influence E15 
demand. Like E85, the fuel requires stations to invest in fueling infrastructure, it has 
around 1.75% lower energy content than E10, and it has an octane advantage over 
E10. Unlike E85, E15 does not require special vehicles. However, E15 has its own 
compatibility challenges in light-duty vehicles. Also, sales of E15 are restricted in the 
summer driving season because the fuel does not currently have an RVP waiver.  
 
E15 use in vehicles:  In 2011, EPA granted a waiver that allowed for E15 use in light-
duty motor vehicles produced after 2001. This constitutes the vast majority of light-
duty vehicles on the road today. Thus, it seems that one could assume that almost all 
vehicle owners in the United States are potential E15 customers. However, several 
auto manufacturers still include E15 warnings on newer vehicles. This conflicting 
message between EPA guidelines on retail pumps (Figure 4a) and vehicle 
manufacturer guidelines (Figure 4b) depress the potential demand for the fuel.   
  
To the authors’ knowledge, there are no academic studies that estimate the demand 
for E15. However, given the similarities between issues affecting E85 and E15 
demand, it seems likely that similar features would arise with E15 that arise with 
E85. At least in the short run, selling substantial volumes of E15 will likely require 
price discounts below E10 on an energy parity basis. At current prices, E15 must be 
Figure 4(a) E15 Fuel Pump Label  
Source: EPA 
Figure 4(b): E15 Gas Cap Warning 
Source: Author’s vehicle 
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priced 4.3 cents per gallon lower than E10 to make it equal on a GGE basis. In Figure 
2, this would require a $0.47 RIN price.  
 
Distribution of E15 Fueling Stations: Although motorists may be willing to fuel with 
E15, its distribution is limited by the number of retail stations which sell the fuel. 
Many fuel stations do not have equipment (pumps, distribution lines, tanks) rated 
for E15. In the short run, constraints on the distribution of E15 would limit its 
distribution and hence its consumption even if E15 were granted an RVP waiver. In 
the long run, distribution of E15 will increase only if fuel distributors have the 
incentive to upgrade their equipment to sell E15, i.e., only if fuel station owners 
foresee a large potential market for the fuel. If RIN prices are capped at $0.10/gal, 
there will be little incentive to increase offering of E15 because its price will be nearly 
the same as E10 (see Figure 2). 
 
RVP Waivers, RIN price caps, and E15/E85 demand 
The tradeoffs between allowing an RVP waiver for E15 and setting a price cap for 
RINs are by now hopefully clear.  An E15 RVP waiver will increase the fuels’ 
availability throughout the year. However, demand for the fuel and the incentive to 
invest in retail distribution capacity will depend on its price relative to E10, which is 
directly related to RIN prices. If Congress or the EPA cap RIN prices, they also cap 
the discount for E15. In this section, we discuss the required RIN prices to achieve 
various (E15-E10) discounts.  We then discuss how markets adjust to offering E15 
under different assumptions about the implementation of the RFS waivers and the 
feasibility of expanding E15 sales. 
 
E15-E10 discounts and RIN prices 
A motorist who cares only about the cost per mile will require a 1.75% E15 discount 
relative to E10. Table 1(a) presents the RIN price needed to meet this discount as a 
function of gasoline and ethanol prices. The calculations assume a $0.75/gal 
wholesale-to-retail markup. For example, with today’s prices, a $0.47 RIN price is 
necessary for E15 prices to be equivalent to E10 on a cost per mile basis. When 
wholesale ethanol prices are low relative to gasoline, E15 prices will already be below 
energy parity with E10 because of its higher ethanol content. However, higher 
relative ethanol costs require higher RIN prices to make E15 competitive with E10. 
The grey cells highlight scenarios that require a RIN price greater than $0.10/RIN to 
achieve energy parity and the orange cells highlight scenarios that require a RIN 
price greater than $0.20/RIN.   
 
It seems likely that increased market penetration of E15 will require E15 to be priced 
even lower than energy parity. For example, motorists may need larger E15-E10 
discounts before they switch fuels because E15 is unfamiliar or because car 
manufacturers do not recommend using E15. Table 1(b) explores the required RIN 
prices to make E15 5% cheaper than E10 at the same wholesale gasoline and ethanol 
prices as in Table 1(a). The required RIN prices are much larger than those in Table 
1(a) because the difference in ethanol content between E10 and E15 is small. Thus, 
consumer reluctance to purchase E15 would require much higher RIN prices.  
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Gasoline Price ($/gal) 
    1.50  1.60  1.70  1.80  1.90  2.00  2.10  2.20  2.30  2.40  2.50  2.60  2.70  2.80  
Ethanol 
Price ($/gal) 
1.00  0.26 0.19 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1.10  0.36 0.29 0.23 0.16 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1.20  0.46 0.39 0.33 0.26 0.20 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1.30  0.56 0.49 0.43 0.36 0.30 0.23 0.16 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1.40  0.66 0.59 0.53 0.46 0.40 0.33 0.26 0.20 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1.50  0.76 0.69 0.63 0.56 0.50 0.43 0.36 0.30 0.23 0.17 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.00 
1.60  0.86 0.79 0.73 0.66 0.60 0.53 0.46 0.40 0.33 0.27 0.20 0.13 0.07 0.00 
1.70  0.96 0.89 0.83 0.76 0.70 0.63 0.56 0.50 0.43 0.37 0.30 0.23 0.17 0.10 
1.80  1.06 0.99 0.93 0.86 0.80 0.73 0.66 0.60 0.53 0.47 0.40 0.33 0.27 0.20 
1.90  1.16 1.09 1.03 0.96 0.90 0.83 0.76 0.70 0.63 0.57 0.50 0.43 0.37 0.30 
2.00  1.26 1.19 1.13 1.06 1.00 0.93 0.86 0.80 0.73 0.67 0.60 0.53 0.47 0.40 
2.10  1.36 1.29 1.23 1.16 1.10 1.03 0.96 0.90 0.83 0.77 0.70 0.63 0.57 0.50 
2.20  1.46 1.39 1.33 1.26 1.20 1.13 1.06 1.00 0.93 0.87 0.80 0.73 0.67 0.60 
2.30  1.56 1.49 1.43 1.36 1.30 1.23 1.16 1.10 1.03 0.97 0.90 0.83 0.77 0.70 
 
 
Gasoline Price ($/gal) 
    1.50  1.60  1.70  1.80  1.90  2.00  2.10  2.20  2.30  2.40  2.50  2.60  2.70  2.80  
Ethanol Price 
($/gal) 
1.00  1.55 1.54 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.50 1.49 1.48 1.47 1.46 1.45 1.45 1.44 1.43 
1.10  1.65 1.64 1.63 1.62 1.61 1.60 1.59 1.58 1.57 1.56 1.55 1.55 1.54 1.53 
1.20  1.75 1.74 1.73 1.72 1.71 1.70 1.69 1.68 1.67 1.66 1.65 1.65 1.64 1.63 
1.30  1.85 1.84 1.83 1.82 1.81 1.80 1.79 1.78 1.77 1.76 1.75 1.75 1.74 1.73 
1.40  1.95 1.94 1.93 1.92 1.91 1.90 1.89 1.88 1.87 1.86 1.85 1.85 1.84 1.83 
1.50  2.05 2.04 2.03 2.02 2.01 2.00 1.99 1.98 1.97 1.96 1.95 1.95 1.94 1.93 
1.60  2.15 2.14 2.13 2.12 2.11 2.10 2.09 2.08 2.07 2.06 2.05 2.05 2.04 2.03 
1.70  2.25 2.24 2.23 2.22 2.21 2.20 2.19 2.18 2.17 2.16 2.15 2.15 2.14 2.13 
1.80  2.35 2.34 2.33 2.32 2.31 2.30 2.29 2.28 2.27 2.26 2.25 2.25 2.24 2.23 
1.90  2.45 2.44 2.43 2.42 2.41 2.40 2.39 2.38 2.37 2.36 2.35 2.35 2.34 2.33 
2.00  2.55 2.54 2.53 2.52 2.51 2.50 2.49 2.48 2.47 2.46 2.45 2.45 2.44 2.43 
2.10  2.65 2.64 2.63 2.62 2.61 2.60 2.59 2.58 2.57 2.56 2.55 2.55 2.54 2.53 
2.20  2.75 2.74 2.73 2.72 2.71 2.70 2.69 2.68 2.67 2.66 2.65 2.65 2.64 2.63 
2.30  2.85 2.84 2.83 2.82 2.81 2.80 2.79 2.78 2.77 2.76 2.75 2.75 2.74 2.73 
 
 
Market impacts of an RVP waiver: All E10 fuel is converted to E15  
We begin with a relatively extreme case by considering a scenario where E15 
becomes the default fuel offered by all stations. The scenario naturally ignores all 
distribution and vehicle technical constraints to using E15 and therefore is most 
relevant in the long run. Nonetheless, the scenario is useful in establishing the 
maximum impact of an E15 RVP waiver.  
 
Consumption of retail gasoline in 2017 was around 143 billion gallons of which 14.4 
billion gallons (10.08%) was ethanol.xvi On a per gallon basis, ethanol is currently 
less expensive than gasoline. Suppose that this would remain true under an RVP 
waiver for E15 and that the industry faces no production constraints.  In this case, 
total ethanol consumption would increase to 21.4 billion gallons, substantially more 
than the 15.84 billion gallons of ethanol produced in 2017. Thus, in this (unrealistic) 
scenario, an RVP waiver and E15 adoption nation-wide could substantively increase 
ethanol use in the United States.   
 
Table 1(a): Required RIN price for wholesale E15 to be equal to retail E10 price on a cost 
per mile basis 
   
 
Table 1(b): Required RIN price for wholesale E15 to be 5% below retail E10 price  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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The conversion of all E10 to E11 would be a more realistic proposal as it would likely 
not be affected by the same technical constraints as E15. Based on gasoline sales of 
143 billion gallons in 2017, ethanol volumes with nationwide adoption of E11 would 
be about 15.7 billion gallons. This policy would drive the price of RINs down near 
zero, reduce sales of E85 near zero and eliminate almost all U.S. exports of ethanol.   
Market impacts of an RVP waiver: Limited E15 offering,  
consumers require fuel discounts  
For our second case, we consider a scenario where: (i) not all fuel stations offer E15; 
(ii) not all motorists purchase E15; and (iii) those consumers that do purchase E15 do 
so only if it is discounted compared to E10 on an energy-equivalent basis.  
First, consider the impact of a cap on RIN prices in the absence of an RVP waiver. 
Figure 5 illustrates the market impacts of a cap on RIN prices. A mandate at level M 
requires a $1 RIN price in this example. The quantity of ethanol that corresponds to 
a RIN price $0.10/gal is given by M10. To obligated parties, the least costly 
compliance path is to blend an amount of ethanol equal to M10 and then purchase 
(M-M10) RINs from the EPA. Thus, a RIN price cap reduces ethanol blending from M 
to M10. Without the price cap, the amount of ethanol given by (M-M10) would likely 
be sold in high ethanol blends such as E15 and E85. Thus, a price cap effectively 
eliminates sales of E15 and E85 in this scenario.  
Figure 5: Market impacts of a cap on RIN prices and motorists value fuel on a 
cost per mile basis 
An E15 RVP waiver increases demand for ethanol, illustrated by the red curve in 
Figure 5. As Tables 1(a) and 1(b) show, the retail discount necessary to make E15 
attractive to motorists likely requires a RIN price above 10 cents under current 
market conditions. Therefore, if the necessary E15 discount requires a RIN price 
$/gal 
Demand 
Supply 
Ethanol 
$1/gal$0.10/gal  
M M10
Demand with E15 
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greater than $0.10/RIN, the RVP waiver with a RIN price cap will not expand E15 
demand relative to a scenario with no RVP waiver and no RIN cap.   
Market impacts of an RVP waiver: E15 sales are limited, consumers 
care only about fuel price 
The difference in energy content between E10 and E15 is small (1.75%). If consumers 
ignore this difference, an RVP waiver may increase E15 demand more than we 
illustrate in Figure 5. Figure 6 graphs ethanol demand in a scenario in which 
motorists ignore the difference in energy content between E10 and E15. Compared to 
Figure 5, the RVP waiver shifts the demand for ethanol even when the RIN price is 
zero. Thus, provided that the wholesale ethanol price is lower than the wholesale 
gasoline price, the RVP waiver increases demand for ethanol at all RIN prices. 
However, the increase is likely modest given limited E15 distribution capacity. Even 
if demand for ethanol increases with the RVP waiver, a binding cap on RIN prices 
still reduce ethanol demand. The effective mandate would be M15>M10, which is 
lower than the statutory mandate at M.  
M10 M15 M Ethanol 
Figure 6: Market impacts of a cap on RIN prices and motorists care only about fuel price 
$/gal 
Demand 
Supply 
$1/gal 
$0.10/gal 
Demand with E15 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The proposed RFS compromise of a cap on RIN prices in exchange for an RVP waiver 
that would allow year-round sales of E15 seemingly has benefits both for those who 
advocate for a reduction in RFS compliance costs and for those who want to see 
expanded sales of high ethanol fuels. Whether both sides would benefit from such a 
deal depends on whether the cap on RIN prices is set high enough to continue to 
incentivize sales of E15 and E85.  
 
Two attributes of E15 determine how high RIN prices need to be to incentivize sales. 
On the one hand, E15 contains more ethanol than E10, so it has about 1.75% lower 
fuel efficiency. To offset this lower efficiency requires a RIN price of about 50 cents 
at current gasoline and ethanol prices. A further disadvantage of E15 is that some car 
manufacturers have, until recently, labeled their cars as not being compatible with 
E15. Offsetting these disadvantages to some extent is E15’s one-point octane 
advantage over E10.  
 
The lack of an RVP waiver for E15 restricts most sales to non-summer months. This 
restriction has likely kept some retailers from installing the E15 fueling equipment 
despite high RIN prices. Thus, granting E15 an RVP waiver would increase the 
likelihood that retailers would make the required investments to sell E15. However, 
these investments will only be made with a waiver if RIN prices are high enough to 
make E15 an attractive fuel.  
 
The proposed cap on RIN prices of 10 cents per gallon, or even 20 cents per gallon, 
would not offset E15’s lower energy content relative to E10 at current market prices. 
Thus, under a capped RIN prices, the cost of driving using E15 would increase 
relative to E10. This means that demand for E15 under capped RIN prices would 
have to rely on the one-point octane advantage of E15. There are high-performance 
cars that require 91 octane fuels, and perhaps some that specify 89 octane. However 
almost all cars on the road only require 87 octane fuel, and the majority of these cars 
will not differ in performance if 88 octane fuel is used. Thus, octane alone is unlikely 
to maintain, much less increase, current E15 demand. 
 
Will major retailers be willing to invest in pumps and tanks to market a fuel that 
increases driving costs and that does not enhance engine performance? Not having 
done the necessary market research, we cannot answer this question definitively. 
However, our research on E85 demand shows that most drivers require a large 
financial incentive to switch from E10 to E85. If this result also holds for E15 
demand, capping RIN prices at low levels makes it implausible that retailers would 
invest in E15 even with the assurance that they could sell the fuel throughout the 
year. Under the proposed compromise, therefore, compliance costs will fall 
dramatically, but E15 and E85 sales will also decrease. The result would be lower 
compliance cost and a lower effective blending mandate. 
 
We cannot say with certainty what would happen to the demand for corn under the 
proposed compromise. A lower effective corn ethanol mandate would decrease the 
demand for corn which would lower the price of corn. It is likely that lower domestic 
demand for ethanol would increase exports which would offset some part of the 
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impacts. A lower bound on the corn price impact from capping RIN prices would 
occur if ethanol exports completely offset lower domestic blending. In this case, corn 
prices would remain the same. An upper bound on the corn price impact is if 
blending is reduced by a billion gallons, which is the difference between the current 
15 billion gallon mandate and 14.3 billion gallons of blending that could occur under 
capped RIN prices. Corn prices under this scenario would drop, in the short-run, by 
around 25 cents per bushel. 
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ENDNOTES
i See https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=26092. 
ii See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philadelphia-energy-solutions-bankrup/u-s-refiner-pes-pins-
bankruptcy-plan-hopes-on-biofuel-costs-idUSKBN1FB26M.  
iii There are currently many other proposals for RFS reform, and the debate on policy options has and will 
continue to evolve.  However, expanding markets for E15 and limiting RIN prices is a common component 
of many reform proposals.  For a broader discussion on RFS reform proposals, see 
http://energypolicy.columbia.edu/research/report/reforming-renewable-fuel-standard.  
iv There are questions over whether EPA has authority to implement these changes to the program.  Many 
current RFS reform proposals will likely require a congressional act.  For a discussion on limits to EPA 
authority, we refer the reader to a series of articles from the University of Illinois farmdocDaily: 
(1) http://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2017/10/three-little-words-all-over-again-epa-revisits.html 
(2) http://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2017/10/general-waiver-rfs-and-severe-economic-harm.html 
(3) http://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2017/10/the-biodiesel-waiver-provision-in-the-rfs.html 
(4) http://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2017/12/still-another-wrinkle-in-the-rfs-rins-price-cap.html 
v See https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-program/cellulosic-waiver-credits-under-renewable-
fuel-standard-program.  
vi For more discussion of the merits of RIN price caps, see 
https://academic.oup.com/ajae/article/100/2/585/4801228. 
vii See https://www.epa.gov/gasoline-standards/gasoline-reid-vapor-pressure and 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IN10703.pdf.   
viii Several densely populated states and most major metropolitan areas have lower RVP limits in the 
summertime.  For more information on RVP limitations and the impact of ethanol blending on RVP, see 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IN10703.pdf and http://www.ethanolrfa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/RVP-Effects-Memo_03_26_12_Final.pdf.  
ix The RFS is a domestic biofuel mandate. Thus, refiners can only use separated RINs for compliance.  
When domestically produced biofuels is exported abroad, RINs are ‘retired’ or removed from the pool of 
eligible RINs that refiners can use towards compliance. Another reform proposal that has been discussed 
is allowing refiners to use RINs generated by exported fuel to count towards compliance. While not the 
focus of this report, the proposal would substantially decrease RINs prices. The U.S. exported over 1.3 
bgals of ethanol in 2017.  Therefore, making RINs that were historically retired eligible for compliance use 
would increase the supply of RINs by roughly 1.3 billion – more than enough to bridge the blend-wall. 
However, it is unlikely that such a proposal would satisfy the intent of the Energy Independence and 
Security Act, and the proposal would likely be challenged by importing countries through the World Trade 
Organization. For more information on U.S. ethanol exports see http://www.ethanolrfa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/2017-U.S.-Ethanol-Trade-Statistics-Summary_CORRECTED2.pdf.  
x Corn ethanol is relatively cheap, and therefore their costs are not a large driver of RIN prices. However, 
with the blend wall, expanding corn ethanol use requires increasing demand for E15 and E85 which, as we 
discuss in the report, requires potentially high discounts relative to E10 and, therefore, high RIN prices. 
Thus, ethanol related RIN price drivers primarily are related to demand-side factors. In contrast, biodiesel 
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has much higher production costs relative to diesel, but it is relatively easy to increase blends of biodiesel. 
Thus, biodiesel related RIN price drivers are primarily related to supply-side factors.     
 
xi The wholesale prices are settlement prices on Chicago Platts futures for ethanol and CBOB from March 
2, 2018.  
 
xii We calculate retail fuel prices as  
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 0.75 + 𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅ℎ(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅ℎ − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) + (1 − 𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅ℎ)(𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺 + 0.1𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅  is the retail fuel price, 𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅ℎ  is the blend rate of ethanol in the fuel,(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅ℎ − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) is the 
wholesale ethanol cost less the RIN subsidy, and (𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺 + 0.1𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) is the wholesale gasoline cost plus the 
RIN tax.  We set 𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅ℎ  equal to 0, 0.1, 0.15, and 0.75 for E0, E10, E15, and E85, respectively.  
 
xiii Ungated versions available at https://www.card.iastate.edu/products/publications/pdf/14pb17.pdf and  
https://www.card.iastate.edu/products/publications/synopsis/?p=1242.  
 
xiv See https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=27&t=10.  
 
xv See https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=31732.  
 
xvi See http://energy.agwired.com/2018/03/05/final-2017-numbers-show-record-ethanol-production/.  
